Brexit negotiations after the Vote Leave coup

Now we have sight of Boris Johnson’s letter to Donald Tusk, we have a little clearer idea about where things are heading subsequent to the Vote Leave takeover of the government after Johnson’s election as Tory leader. While the press comment has – rightly – focused on the attention given in the letter to the backstop and the issue of Northern/Ireland, the key paragraph is surely the one on p. 2 which talks about the backstop being ‘inconsistent with the UK’s desired final destination for a sustainable long-term relationship with the EU’ and, specifically, this bit:

Although we will remain committed to world-class environmental, product and labour standards, the laws and regulations to deliver them will potentially diverge from those of the EU. That is the point of our exit and our ability to enable this is central to our future democracy.

There is an easy point to score here in that not one aspect of our democracy ever put Vote Leave into Downing Street – check, for instance, the 2017 General Election which delivered a hung parliament and May’s Euro elections results in the UK. Brexit remains, as it always did, a battle for control of the Tory Party in which all of us have been caught up.

It’s also very easy to criticise the tone of the letter – in something purporting to re-open negotiations, in superficial pursuit of an expressed desire that the EU might compromise, it is clear that it very much closes them down by hardening the red lines which were already the logical conclusion to May’s botched negotiation. It has, entirely predictably, already received short shrift from the EU and presumably, this was its purpose such that the EU can be portrayed as the ‘inflexible’ enemy unwilling to compromise to secure a deal. This is evidently not a serious attempt at a re-negotiation. If further evidence was required, it’s surely there in the paragraph towards the bottom of p. 2 of the letter withdrawing from the commitment set out in the agreed Joint Report to ‘full alignment’ with the single market and customs union. Negotiation cannot sensibly proceed when one side is so publicly thumbing its nose at agreed commitments previously entered into.

Even so, we should note very carefully the threat implicit in the paragraph quite above – that, unless the EU gives us the exit deal we want, the UK will move to a de-regulatory ‘paradise’, undercutting the EU on its environmental, product and labour standards and becoming a sort of Singapore in Europe, sitting on Europe’s offshore and acting as a haven for the sorts of dodgy interests that have given us Brexit in the first place. If that is the ‘UK’s final destination for a sustainable long-term relationship’ (whatever that tortuous expression actually means in practice) – well, I can’t recall being asked to vote on that; and neither, of course, is it at all sustainable to be seeking perpetually to drive down standards, including on labour, in a race to the bottom. (Of course and not only labour – it makes absolutely no sense to have divergent standards on the environment when global action is required to save the planet: but then, climate change denial is one of the reasons we have Brexit – and it won’t stop there until the rest of the international institutions trying to address themselves to climate change have also been undermined). In this respect, proposals for no state pension until 75 (‘Don’t retire, expire!’) is only the start.

If indeed it it not a serious attempt at re-negotiation, and that the real target of the letter is not Brussels but the domestic audience, then it does, perhaps, further signal a general election prior to 31 October.

We should also therefore note the language in the letter around ‘anti-democratic’ which is not just Dominic Cummings’s word du jour to boil the debate around the EU into a soundbite – it also symbolises the verbal oppression to which those who would be likely opponents of a UK-as-Singapore policy would be subject. We have seen this sort of language before and very recently (‘saboteurs’, ‘traitors’, enemies of the people’, ‘collaborators’) but it casts here a very wide range of likely opponents of government policy as opponents of democracy. Environmental organisations and activists, food welfare and safety NGOs, and trade unions alike – all would oppose the driving down of standards in their respective fields and all, it therefore seems, are likely to be seen in the process as undermining a project which the unelected (oh the irony!) Cummings (a figure held earlier this year, remember, to have been in contempt of Parliament) now chooses to describe as ‘central to our future democracy’. Trade unions have famously before been seen as ‘the enemy within’, and both unions and environmental organisations are no strangers to infiltration by state agents, but the febrile political atmosphere in which we find ourselves as a result of the 2016 referendum and ten years of austerity politics, amidst the continuing trashing of the UK’s domestic institutions, to which we can now add the fifth estate to the fourth, and indeed the first, casts an entirely new light on the phrase.

It’s beginning indeed to look a lot like fascism.

 

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The Euros and Brexit: stirring the muddied pool

I cast my vote on Thursday last week for the type of Europe I wanted to see over the next five years: socialist, re-distributive and for the many, not the few; for a fair, free and sustainable Europe. Elections of MEPs to the European Parliament should reflect the type of Europe we want to see – though, of course, these are not normal times in the UK and these elections, organised in haste and poorly with regard to European citizens excluded from the process, were not normal ones.

It would be a mistake to see these elections as reflective of how people would vote in a general election – a party with deliberately no policies other than ‘Brexit’ would not then top the poll when its candidates were compelled to say what they think about all the things they were deliberately silenced on in the run-up to last Thursday; and neither in a general election would the main parties be almost absent from campaigning, giving Farage and his odd mix of candidates such a free run. The only leaflet this household ever received was indeed the early one from the Brexit Party (and that includes the SNP whose favours were, otherwise, the only ones pinned to the lamp-posts outside our local polling station).

One of the things I note about this particular set of elections is that they have re-taught the lesson that electors cannot be taken for granted and that, if you don’t campaign, you don’t get their vote. It’s not so much that the parties that were clear on Brexit – either for or against – did better as a result than the mainstream parties who were less clear; it’s also that an absence of campaigning gives people other than the die-hards few reasons to vote for you. Here in Eilean Siar, it’s probably therefore not a surprise that both the SNP and the Brexit Party (44% and 20% of the vote, respectively) did better than they did across the rest of Scotland (38% and 15%).

One of the other things is that the parties who did well in the UK – the liberals and the greens – also did well in the rest of Europe. Elsewhere, this is likely to reflect the awareness resulting from the high publicity given to the actions of, and the surge in support for, Extinction Rebellion. There may, as a result, be good reason to assume that the European demos is alive and kicking, despite those who wish to deny its existence. It’s also likely to be the case that, right across Europe, the increased turnout (again above 50%) reflects higher participation among those aged 18-24, and that voter registration campaigns, and imaginative policies that appeal to younger people, are increasingly likely to bear fruit at the ballot box.

More generally, and because several parties had campaign platforms that were openly pro- or anti-EU, the election results do allow us to read into them some lessons for what they mean for Brexit. It is clear that the polarisation in UK politics around Brexit, with attitudes towards remain/leave counting heavier than traditional party loyalties, is continuing. We know, for example, how much of the voting electorate this time around are dead-set on leaving the EU even (or perhaps particularly) without a deal. Based on the turnout, this one in three of voters falls to around 22% of even the registered electorate who were qualified to vote. There is, therefore, no mandate for no deal and Parliament is – and will continue to be – right to reject it.

With 27 seats and a vote share of 32%, the Brexit Party did better than UKIP in 2014 (24 seats and 28%), before the farce of the intervening years saw most of its MEPs desert – but not so much better; and, indeed, that it did apparently improve was within the likely margins of error of a low poll and given the more or less free run it was given at the campaign by the mainstream parties. We don’t know from this that support for Brexit is increasing – and, indeed, it is likely that it is not, based on what we know about the age patterns of voters in this context and the fairly entrenched views that electors hold. It’s also well worth pointing out here that the pro-EU platforms put out by the Liberal Democrats and the Greens in the UK made their votes weigh more heavily than those of the Brexit Party and UKIP, even before we build in the greater complications posed by the similarly pro-EU support of the nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales and the nuanced positions of the mainstream parties. And it’s also well worth contrasting the number of votes cast for no deal parties (5.9m) with the 6.1m people who have signed the Revoke Article 50 petition.

Farage has spoken of the results driving his wish to join the negotiations on Brexit. Well, as a career politician who has made his career while denying its own existence, he would do – but this is meaningless. There are no negotiations to join – and it’s not clear what a party committed to a ‘clean break’ Brexit based, essentially, on no deal would have to add in any case. The EU is content with the agreement it has reached (even if it has gone a lot further than some domestic politicians, like Macron, wanted) and, while it would no doubt re-open talks were the UK’s/May’s existing red lines to be relaxed, it is clear that the accommodation of a representative with such a poor record of activity in the European Parliament, and at least one of whose new intake has already talked of making life difficult in Brussels, is not going to persuade them to do so.

And neither is a new Tory leader – for party political reasons almost certainly to be a committed Brexiteer – likely to lead to the EU to consider re-opening negotiations. While it might in some respect leave the EU a little clearer than hitherto about what it is the UK actually wants, the threat of a no deal Brexit within the EU counts less than the threat to the EU single market of any bad deal which jeopardised it. And I don’t think that such a stance is negotiatory bluster: for the EU, no deal is indeed better than a bad deal. Further, as we know, there will be no free trade deal discussion in a post-no deal scenario unless the outstanding issues that have proved apparently so difficult for no-dealers so far (the border on the island of Ireland, the settlement of the UK’s remaining financial obligations and citizens’ rights) are properly dealt with first. There will be a polite reception in Brussels, as befits the arrival of a ‘world king’, but the threat of no deal is likely to lead the EU to choose not to extend beyond 31 October the extension under which we are now working.

So, the European election, in combination with the aftermath of May’s duressed resignation, has made a no deal Brexit in October much more likely. The few votes given in the election to the mainstream parties seeking to negotiate around how to get a withdrawal agreement through parliament highlights the polarised leave/remain UK in which we live – and, thus, the dangers of being caught in the middle. Of course, we do not know how those who did not turn out last Thursday would vote in a general election – and we may yet return to the two-party politics (at UK level) we last spoke of as recently as less than two years ago. But, that doesn’t seem likely as long as we rumble along without a resolution to the issue which continues substantially to divide us.

With the existential threat now facing the Tories, the time is right – in the likely absence of a general election – to press for another referendum. There is no track through parliament for a negotiated settlement and neither, on this most recent evidence of what the public thinks, is it clear that there is public appetite for one, anyway. Asking the public at this point what it wants to do now – in particular, whether it wants to remain in the EU or leave with no deal, given what we now know and given that leaving without a deal was not the argument put up by those promoting leave back in 2016 – is, therefore, the only way forwards. Such a binary question might overcome some aspects of the objections of those who do not want to be asked about their views in general, as before; and it is also likely to produce the decisive result required to allow us to put this issue to bed.

Perhaps then, after a fresh referendum based on a binary no deal/remain choice, given the failure of and apparent appetite for a negotiated settlement, we can make a focused start on bringing our polarised nation back together: a referendum and then the general election to wipe clean the post-2017 slate and facilitate a fresh start.

Bring on the Euros

So the UK government has finally capitulated and declared the inevitability of what just about all of us have known for several weeks: that the European elections, due on 23 May, must take place since there is simply not enough time for any withdrawal to be ‘ratified’ in the UK under the terms of the extension of the two-year Article 50 process  offered at the Special Council meeting last month.

Typical of the government’s style this might be – shut your eyes, put your fingers in your ears and pretend something isn’t happening until such times as reality becomes too much to bear and you have to cave in (TS Eliot was quite possibly right, by the way) – but an election is neither something to ‘regret‘ nor to object to on the grounds of cost, both of which, in their own way, seek to put a price on something which is priceless. Theresa May might regret having to hold an election given the calamitous state of the Tory Party – out of funds with donors running shy of leadership uncertainty, and consequently having to run a ‘cut-price’ campaign, and in internal ‘meltdown‘ over the state of her own leadership of it – but that is of course a different matter entirely; and, while the state of public opinion on the government’s mishandling of the Brexit negotiations is no doubt a reason for fear of May 23 by the government itself, holding people accountable is what democracies were designed for. (NB the 8% who ‘approve’ the government’s handling of the Brexit negotiations is an argument all by itself that all referendums should require super majorities – it’s twice the marginal 52:48 gap created by the 2016 referendum.) Bring it on.

Now the UK’s participation in the European elections is confirmed, and we have the increasingly real prospect of these delivering an annihilated Tory Party falling apart in office, the extended talks between Labour and the Theresa May faction of the Tories seem to have fulfilled a substantial part of their purpose. In contrast to Paul Mason, however, I wouldn’t argue that Labour should pull out of them just yet. They will surely fall apart in due course anyway under the weight of their own contradictions, with Theresa May unable to offer even a customs union on anything other than a meaningless temporary basis – itself incapable of resolving the problem of the Northern Ireland border, insufficient to deliver anything like a jobs-first Brexit and leaving the question of services entirely untouched – still less move on any other of her red lines. The talks are, quite clearly, going nowhere other than to underline that the current party of government is fractured, incapable and without a mandate.

But, that is useful purpose enough in the present situation. Furthermore, in the slightly more medium-term, were Labour to swing behind a confirmatory vote, as is my own hope, there is a clear strategic requirement for it being able to indicate to its leave-backing voters who have not already gone for the full Farage that it first did all it could to secure a deal with the government which delivered the mandate of the 2016 referendum (recognising its lies, obfuscations and fraudulent data manipulations); and that the reason for that failure lay entirely at the door of the government’s own intransigence. This is not just about triangulation; it is about driving that existing wedge in the Tory Party home and, providing that strategy continues to work as it currently appears to be doing, I’m still on board.

Mason (above link) is right, however, in arguing that Labour needs to campaign actively in the election; and with clear support for the Party of European Socialists manifesto (which affiliates like-minded parties from all over the EU and Norway, and forms part of the progressive Socialists and Democrats grouping in the European Parliament) and, subsequently, to engage where possible with the greens and the left. The European elections are about the future of Europe and, tempting as it is to see them as a referendum on Brexit, they are (and need to be) much more than about that. That said, it would be good to see an increase in the the low levels of turnout, historically 35-40%, this time around. The Labour manifesto will clearly embody the PES principles to which its candidates sign up, although it will clearly also be embodying existing Conference policy on Brexit. Much as I’m in sympathy with the intention of Tom Watson, and others, to gain a greater commitment to a confirmatory vote at the NEC meeting, the manifesto can do little more than articulate what is existing policy.

The difficulty here is, of course, that we cannot wait for Conference to debate a change in policy since, by then, it will be too late; if, indeed, only a clutch of European countries now want the UK to stay, then any further extension beyond 31 October is clearly already out of the question. Personally, I’m also reluctant to have my vote on 23 May depicted as a vote for a Brexit-supporting party: I will be voting on European issues and about the future of Europe, and with a view to the MEPs I help elect playing their full role in the next European Parliament to end austerity and construct a Europe for the many. With that in mind, and remembering the specificities of a European Parliament election being more than about domestic issues, let there be no talk of any vote for Labour as being a vote for a Brexit-supporting party.

With the news from at least one source (quoting a report in the Telegraph) that Theresa May is engaged in scenario planning for a three-way referendum – her deal/no deal/remain – if (and when) the talks with Labour fail and Parliament can find no other route forward, it’s clear that the time is right to keep on talking while, all the while, keeping on the pressure for that confirmatory vote.

24 hours in Brussels

I had a quick trip to Brussels last week immediately ahead of the European Council which offered a ‘flextension’ get-out-of-jail card on Brexit (much to the amused interest of people who I’d told where I’d been). (And which, of course, we’ve used immediately for parliament to go on recess.)

Brussels is a place I’ve been going to more or less annually for trips, conferences and seminars, and other events, since about 1994 and I both know it reasonably well (as far as anyone can ‘know’ any city), and like it: it can hide its charms, to some degree, and these might also be somewhat idiosyncratic and easy to mock, as Channel 4’s Travel Man (coincidentally on a repeated showing on C4 Sunday afternoon) clearly uncovered without a great deal of effort. Walking down on arrival at the Gare du Nord to my hotel (yes, I know…), I met the sight of a young man openly making good, if unofficial, use of a street planter in performance art tribute to one of Brussels’s statues (maybe this one, or perhaps this one).

But the airport is well located, just fifteen minutes by train (of which there are five or six an hour) from the centre of Brussels, and without charging rip-off fares; and even the automated passport barriers work without supercilious staff suggesting I take off my glasses like I’m intentionally using them as some sort of disguise (BA/Heathrow Airport seriously take note). And how you can not like a place whose baggage hall has a jukebox:

IMG_0135 (Custom)

Unusually, I managed to get from these islands to where I wanted to be the same day (morning flight from Benbecula-Glasgow; a short wait for a flight from Glasgow-Heathrow T5; and then a slightly longer wait than flight from T5-Brussels), though the downside was that this meant this trip was one of the shortest I have ever made (little more than the aforementioned 24 hours, from late afternoon one day to just before dinner the next). I was there for the annual meeting of the Editorial Board of the SEER Journal, with discussion of many interesting ideas, articles and innovations coming the way of our subscribers in 2019/20, but no visit to Brussels would be complete without a meal at Bij den Boer or without sampling a few beers.

24 hours either side of a busy and important meeting didn’t deliver too much opportunity for the latter. (And gentle rain in the evening, persisting more heavily right throughout the next day, didn’t encourage much in the way of trekking or, indeed, of photos.) However, I did manage to make Brasserie Omnibus, a cafe bar  with a train theme, my local for the duration, serving a rather good, if sweet, Tripel Le Fort (plus a welcome little dish of bar snacks); while a nearby hotel bar delivered a proper temperature Rochefort Trappist 8 (which currently makes Belgium’s top 50 beers on Rate Beer), offering plenty of chocolatey goodness; while a wander around the corner from Bij den Boer to Cafe Merlo offered some new-style small-batch craft beer via Brasserie de la Senne, whose Zinnebir (a Belgian blonde) provided citrusy dryness to the post-dinner chat with colleagues wondering what the heck was happening with Brexit (my only new observation being that the UK is – or at least was, last week – a country in a state of open revolt in search of a revolution). All beers from bottles, by the way.

IMG_0136 (Custom)

So, with a tinge of sadness – this being (possibly, who knows?) my last trip to Brussels as a ‘free’ citizen, it was a farewell to the city of Brussels with at least a hopeful au revoir/tot ziens. ‘Til next time then, comrades (if the creek don’t rise).

Book Review: The Wall

John Lanchester’s The Wall is frequently, and indeed best, described as ‘dystopian’ – relating to or denoting an imagined state or society where there is great suffering or injustice.

Lanchester’s vision is of a future somewhat shrunken UK surrounded by a 10,000km wall built, primarily, in response to the impact of ‘the Change’ – climate change resulting in dramatically raised sea levels which have destroyed every beach, led to the destruction of food chains and food security, and made fUK a place of cold weather much more closely associated with our latitude than is currently the case; and patrolled by Defenders on a two-year stint of compulsory national service whose job it is to keep out – with extreme prejudice – all those who seek to get over it. This is not because the fUK within resembles anything like a promised land – inter-generational conflict, a society based on the racist exploitation of others, population collapse and a vast level of its limited resource sucked into security see to it that fUK is a place of cold, hatred, totalitarian control, guilt, bitterness and barely-disguised fear – and in which ‘Sweet moderation/Heart of this nation‘ has, finally, deserted us – but it does highlight the desperation motivating those seeking nevertheless to enter.

fUK society is divided into a globalised Elite still able to fly; the elderly, blamed for the disaster since it was on their watch that the Change happened; Defenders, some of whom, like Kavanagh, the central character, dream futilely of joining the Elite but whose more realistic future is to become a Breeder whose key role in staving off further population decline is rewarded with time away from the Wall; and Others – those managing to get over The Wall and who are, once caught up with, given the choice of enslavement or euthanasia. Those who are judged responsible for influxes of Others over the Wall are de-chipped – essentially, they are ‘enemies within’ – and put out to sea on a one-in-and-one-out basis. The prospects of any sort of redemption for Kavanagh and his colleagues appear bleak.

The novel is opaque as regards just how far into the future this vision takes place. Some will see Lanchester’s fUK as a continuation of several trends already present in society (all dystopian novels, including The Road, 1984 and Brave New World are essentially versions of the present). With this in mind, calls for non-intervention in the case of the tiny numbers of migrants crossing the Channel in small boats, on the grounds that such action might encourage others, are being made; while the dehumanising nature of our political discourse and the normalisation of hate speech facilitated by social media platforms and given full voice by Brexit, with Stephen Yaxley-Lennon’s Facebook page taken down only yesterday and with Shamima Begum’s image used in ‘light-hearted fun’ at a type of shooting range aimed at young children, give Lanchester’s fiction a very real footing. Unmistakeably, this is also a ‘post’-Brexit novel – its language is the language of Brexit – to add to a burgeoning list. What he is outlining in The Wall is not the future – but it does indeed feel a lot like a version of the future towards which we are currently headed.

Lanchester does not seek to describe the state of fUK. (Incidentally, this is not a term that he uses, but the UK seems still to exist in some way given that Scotland appears to continue to be a part of it, although how much of Scotland is actually left is a moot point given that it is also referred to as ‘the north’.) Indeed, this is not a grim tale of what we have become but to take this, in a quite matter-of-fact way, as a given. This provides a solid starting point for the novel’s exploration of human reactions to their state and to question how on earth it is we have got there. Whereas the history of the present up to September 2001 had been the tearing down of walls, as Lanchester himself has commented, the post-World Trade Center history of the present has represented a dehumanising of the ‘other’ coupled in the last ten years with a post-crash austerity politics which has sought to use the ‘other’ as a target for blame; and on which the present-day version of inter-generational inequality – our children’s generation being the first to transfer resources back to their parents (a reversal of the accepted inter-generational inequality of the past) – has much to comment.

A slightly more ambitious novel than this one might have sought to establish The Wall as a character in its own right but, here, its role is simply a physical barrier while yet underscoring a clear point about our obliviousness to our environment – our inability to learn and to act in its defence. Given the known CO2 emissions involved in the manufacture of concrete, the construction of 10,000km of concrete wall, five metres high on the seaward side and involving ‘millions of tons’ of the stuff, erected in response to the destruction wrought by climate change, provides an acutely ironic comment on our own lack of understanding of what we are doing when it comes to green issues. As indeed, given the environmental impact of air travel, does Kavanagh’s appreciation of the elite as being those that are still able to fly.

As other reviews have indicated, the style of Lanchester’s writing is ‘affectless’ (see here and here – both ££) and its dispassionate nature makes the characters’ role in their own misery somewhat hard to work through until we reach the final section. fUK is an individualised, post-collective society – a reminder that this is a state which those driving Brexit seek further to entrench – and the implications of that for the UK’s current direction is clear. There is no collective organisation in response to the conditions in which people find themselves and neither, does it seem, is there any attempt at riots and revolution.

Such attempts may of course have already been defeated and, as I say, it is not Lanchester’s aim to describe what we have become but to use this is a platform to contemplate why. One of my earlier thoughts while reading the first two of the book’s thirds, aided not least by the almost complete lack of typos on the pages, was that this was a novel written by artificial intelligence; or that the characters we meet within it are actually cyborgs. Neither is true (at least, I don’t think either is true) but key to understanding how the characters interact with their society, and therefore to how Lanchester contemplates our current state, is our increasing lack of empathy. The Wall is, here, not without hope. Re-learning, in the first place, and then re-establishing empathy – the key also to addressing a lack of collective awareness and solidarity – may yet give Kavanagh and his colleagues the key to overcoming their state. It is a long way back from there – but if we are to avoid that state, re-establishing empathy before we have to re-learn it, and while we still have time to appreciate precisely what it means, may yet help us avoid such a state’s worst excesses.

Recycled independents

I watched with bemusement and a certain sense of déjà vu the decision of seven Labour MPs (now apparently eight) yesterday to resign from the Party and sit as independents. The echoes of the formation of the SDP back in 1981 are strong – and well explored elsewhere, most recently by Keith Flett in a thoughtful post on unintended consequences – not least with the SDP also having sought, and failed, to ‘break the mould of British politics’.

As someone who also resigned from the Party on a point of principle (the ludicrous scenario of the party of labour digging up long-lost legislation from the statute book to get around the 2000 firefighters’ dispute), though I’m not sure that anyone actually noticed back then, I understand that discontent sometimes comes to a point of no return. And, some members of the group are clearly highly uncomfortable with, and angry at, aspects of the Party’s direction and approach. Not currently being a member of the Party, however, it’s really not up to me to comment on what is someone else’s point of principle other than to say that such departures are always regrettable.

The SDP had its Limehouse Declaration, but the gang of eight appear to have very little as regards an attempt at policy direction. Braving the ‘Whoa! are you sure you want to go there?’ pop-up from my McAfee Web Adviser tool which, somewhat comically, rated the group’s website as ‘slightly risky’ when I dialled it up earlier this evening, I can see a set of fairly loose motherhood-and-apple-pie values – but, on the issue of the day, very little as regards what the group might be calling for on Brexit. 1981 still casts a long shadow on UK politics and it might be that the group is extremely hesitant to engage with policy formality in terms of anything resembling a Council for Social Democracy. The fate of (rightly) much-derided blue Labour/red Tory initiatives also has a comment to make on this. Perhaps, on the other hand, this is still coming – and it may be that the realignment of UK politics in the wake of the Change wrought by the 2016 referendum may still come about if UKUP entryism into the Tory Party represents more than just the usual relentless self-promotion; or if the current crop of cabinet ministers ever actually have to make good on their threat to resign in the face of a no-deal Brexit – and it may be with these things in mind that any attempt at a policy programme has yet to appear.

I’d suggest, however, that this group’ll be a long time waiting, splits by moderate Tories continuing to be a somewhat less likely outcome, even if Brexit does change everything, particularly given what seems to be the major driver behind the group’s decision: discontent with their own party never looks attractive to members of another, even if there are reasons for discontent over there, too.

Given that Brexit was one of the prompters of their decision to leave – all are supporters of putting the terms of the UK’s departure from the EU to the people (as, in principle, am I) – I might have expected a bit more. Or, actually, quite a bit less – since it’s not only the programme which is somewhat nebulous; the timing of their departure from the Party is also extremely puzzling.

Their departure may not make the mathematics on a people’s vote any different – but it does deprive the Parliamentary Labour Party of a strong voice on behalf of a people’s vote; and, furthermore, it may well undermine it among the Party’s loyalists who would not want to espouse policies supported by breakaway MPs. It also, for the same potential reasons, complicates the arithmetic around Yvette Cooper’s attempt to compel the Prime Minister to request more time from the EU to prevent the UK crashing out on 28 March, as it will by default unless something is done to prevent it. Furthermore, the Party’s conference programme is clear and encompasses a referendum, reiterated regularly (and most recently on Sunday) by John McDonnell, should no deal be possible or should the terms of the deal fail to protect jobs and the economy – regardless of the fall-out from Honda, among others – workers’ rights and environmental protection standards. That is, at least, still on the table and, the circumstances for resignation should that policy be ignored are clearly therefore not yet in place. The departure – on these grounds – is evidently premature.

And, furthermore, like all breakaways, it has redirected the pressure within Westminster away from the government’s farcical Brexit negotiations process and preparations; and away from the Prime Minster’s albeit incredibly half-hearted attempt at political engagement among MPs. It might, in extremis, lead to Theresa May seeking to exploit the split by calling a snap election – though it may be that she has learned from the last time. Nevertheless, with this in mind, discipline remains the key since a loss of focus will represent a loss of opportunity. Ultimately, such intense failures of policies and of personality from the Prime Minister need to be continually at the centre of attention and continually ratcheting up the pressure if there is to be a proper, decent deal on Brexit or, otherwise, a people’s vote. Any such breakaway provides a valve to relieve that pressure, with the Prime Minister thereby able to get one step closer to a crash-out which will keep the hard right in the ERG on board and a Tory Party together, if not exactly united; splits from the moderate side of the Tories being, when push comes to shove, a somewhat less likely outcome, in my view, whatever the rumours.

Whatever the gang of eight think are the chances of gaining the actual support of their Party for a people’s vote, their departure not only does not make it more likely, it actually makes it a bit less so. And, at this stage, that’s very frustrating.

Book review: Long Road from Jarrow

I was given this as a present (thanks, Tracy!) a couple of years ago and immediately relished the anticipation of reading it, although it has had to wait more than its fair share of time sitting on my to-read shelf. It ought not to have: it’s clear that Maconie is as much of a fan of Newcastle as I – and I mean here the city, not the Toon. At 17, applying for several of what were then called polys, I arrived in Newcastle and, in an echo of Maconie’s opening paragraphs here, sweeping over the King Edward Bridge with the city spread out before and below me, I was sold on the prospect of living and studying here long before I ever got anywhere near the campus.

Not only that, I was a sand dancer for a while – although that’s not a term I recognised until Maconie’s earlier book, Pies and Prejudice. In the summer of 1984, I had a job working in the South Shields branch office of the Northern Rock, alongside David, Carol, Jean, Lesley, Alison, Anne-Marie (whose maternity cover I was) and June, whose husband was a striking miner up at Westoe Colliery. In almost daily conversations about the strike, I came to realise for the first time the value of taking collective action for something you believed in – June was herself the embodiment of the notion that the miners’ strike was fought equally by strong families as much as by strong miners.

My route into Shields on the metro from my Tyneside flat along Sunderland Road in Gateshead (bulldozed into a new development some time ago, I note) took me through Jarrow (if I was lucky, sharing the ride alongside Elizabeth, who also worked in Shields three doors up at the Newcastle Building Society and whose stop was Jarrow. The Rock – in those days still a building society prior to its transformation by rapacious gold-diggers into a risk-taking ‘proper’ financial institution – is no longer there, of course, but the Newcastle, which remains a building society, has relocated further down Fowler Street, and expanded, while Virgin Money, which took over parts of the Rock, now seems to occupy the place, and the footprint, formerly vacated by the Newcastle).

In October 1986, three months after graduating and newly installed in work on Teesside, I found myself back in ‘Jarra’ and listening to the general secretary of GMB, John Edmonds, at the fiftieth celebration issue yet another apology for the failure of the labour and trade union movements to offer better moral, practical and indeed financial support to the marchers, ahead of the departure the following day (IIRC) of the 1986 version of the Jarrow march. As he invited one of the few remaining 1936 marchers to join him on the stage, there was a small shuffle behind and just to the right of me – and up stepped a man whose name I can’t quite remember, but who might possibly have been Jimmy Foggon. I was standing feet away (and in front of) a living legend, himself (and again) just a part of the crowd. This might have been for personal reasons, but I found it very odd.

The reasons for the lack of solidarity from the organised labour and trade union movements for the 1936 marchers are fairly well explored in Maconie’s book, although his aim here is not to provide a history of the march, of which there are several also referenced here. It would of course not be possible for one man walking alone (and sometimes taking buses and taxis) to recreate the collective endeavours of 200 men – the logistics of keeping that many men on the road for three weeks are clearly considerable; and we should not lose sight that one of the strengths of the original march was its collective nature. However, by following the same route, and on the same days in October, Maconie’s aim was to take the temperature of post-Brexit referendum Britain in a series of conversations with the people he encountered en route. As a sociologist, and a wry but clear-sighted commentator on the foibles of modern day living, Maconie is well equipped for the task even if, on occasion, he appears a little lost and somewhat lonely – an observer rather than a participant – and even though the politics will not be for everyone (on the left, but equally certainly no fan of Jeremy Corbyn).

It was a surprise to see for how many of those he meets that the 1936 march was not a total blank: a relative success for the teaching of relatively recent social (and labour) history, I feel, as well as the presence of the march in the collective consciousness. However, Maconie’s biggest achievement in bringing this book to life is its reminder that we have been here before: the cry of the working class to be heard, and for good quality, skilled jobs – frequently at the forefront of analysts and Brexit apologists – is not a new phenomenon. Capitalism in crisis, bringing devastation to towns dependent for work and a living on a single source (or a series of chained sources), can be seen not just in the outcome of the 2016 vote and in the miners’ strike, as well as in the loss of steel industry jobs in Consett and Corby and Motherwell and Port Talbot and Redcar, and with new jobs frequently being low-skilled, low paid and insecure; it is certainly also there in the decision of 200 men from Jarrow to walk to London carrying their petition about the closure of the shipyard and the need for more work to save the town. And being ultimately fobbed off. That we are still having the same debates eighty-plus years on is evidently a reflection of the continual failure of neoliberal economics based on the laws of the market, alongside its continual success in the perpetual selling of promises and in the trading of lies to the working class by rich elites. The answer to all that is reasonably clear – and there is a message there too for labour organisations.

That Brexit will also lead to job losses amongst the working class is also clear: the cry to be heard is likely to lead to the cry for further investment in working class communities and no-one, ordinary voter or elected representative, ought to be trusting the promises of this government on that. But it is the greatest tragedy that those who responded to the lies of the Leave campaign are those who are likely to lose most from it, while those elites who teased it and led it are those who will be among those who profit the most. It is the outcomes of that which probably need to be feared more than the question of ‘undermining democracy’ by the simple expedient of asking people whether, three years on, the bright future outside the EU sold to them and for which they voted back in 2016 is indeed still what they want or whether they now see it for what it is: a mirage, or a chimera.

Maconie concludes with a fairly rosy passage on the liars and the bullies, the loudmouths and the puritans, the pub bores and the ineffectual commissars not being the best of us and, while that’s true, it’s also true that our public discourse has chosen to put the views of these same groups in an elevated position. The referendum itself, the way it was conducted and its aftermath in naturalising the telling of lies and in the trashing of political standards and discourse, as the Article 50 process speeds towards its irrevocable conclusion, will continue to reverberate not least in terms of a decision over whether the Scottish working class, which is fundamentally pro-EU, will continue to align itself with an English working class which is anti-EU stemming, at least in part, from an unresolved and boorish English nationalism* or, instead, with the working class on the rest of the continent. Inevitably, there are many in Scotland who will see the establishment of a hard border on the island of Britain, to the north of Carlisle and Berwick, as A Good Thing.

The more telling passage in Maconie’s journey perhaps came a little earlier, however, when Maconie, an Italophile, discovers that Bedford has a population of 15-20,000 Italians – around one-fifth to one-quarter of the population – originally as a result of the brickworks needing labour in the 1950s in the literal reconstruction of Britain and many Italian men from the Mezzogiorno needing work. They were given four-year contracts with the right to stay at the end and many did – though many also returned home for personal reasons. During that time, their continued presence would have been at the whim of the brickworks managers and, despite tough living and working conditions, workers would have needed to keep their noses clean or lose the right to stay – a post-Brexit future based on a return to the past and to the exploitation of migrant labour for which no trade unionist can be in favour but with which we continue to be ill-equipped to deal. We can note that Bedford probably voted for Brexit in around the same proportion as the UK as a whole and a little higher than in the rest of the south-east (c. 53%). Building solidarity among the working class continues, it seems, to be a long-term project, as much now as in 2016, and as in 1956, and as in 1936.

*text in italics originally included in the draft mapped out in my head but which then failed to make it on to the page.

Now: for a People’s Vote

So, now we know that:

(a) a sizable proportion of Tory MPs have no confidence in Theresa May as leader of their own Party; but they all have confidence in the government she leads; and that

(b) a similar proportion of Tory MPs have no faith in the practical outcome of the major, political project of our time, which has utterly consumed government for the last two years and in spite of all the other social and economic issues which desperately need to be addressed; but they all have confidence in the government itself.

Yesterday’s vote was astonishing not in the defeat of Theresa May’s deal itself, which was entirely predictable, but in the manner and scale of it. A loss by 230 votes was not only a parliamentary ‘record’ for a government (to add to that which May already has – time will look on her as leader of the government in a way about as friendly as it already has of her immediate predecessor: Theresa ‘strong and stable’ May compared to David ‘chaos with Ed Miliband‘ Cameron). It also, by one reckoning, attracted the support of fewer than 50 MPs not on the ‘payroll’ (i.e. with government jobs and who are mandated to vote for something the government supports, or else resign). For a policy issue on which a three-line whip was imposed on Tory MPs, this is astonishing. And, three of those who did vote in favour were Labour MPs (alongside three more sitting as independents). And, finally, the 196 Tory votes she did get – the 202 votes in favour minus these six – were actually three fewer Tory MPs than voted for her in the first round of the Tory leadership contest in 2016.

Yet not, apparently, a matter for the resignation of May herself. Now, after the loss of the vote of confidence by 19 votes tonight (the DUP of course has 10 MPs), we know that the government cannot be compelled to resign, it’s time for a People’s Vote (yes, Brenda from Bristol, another one).

This necessarily needs to follow an application to the EU to extend the Article 50 withdrawal process specifically to encompass a further consultation with the UK public and would need a majority of MPs to vote in favour, perhaps as one of the four ‘indicative options’ for which the Exiting the EU Committee called today. (It’s also worth noting that Dominic Grieve has also submitted his Second Referendum bill.) Not a ‘re-run of the 2016 vote’, not a ‘second chance to get it right’, not ‘the elite overturning the will of the people’ though some will clearly choose to spin it in any or all of these ways – but a referendum based on the practical issues which now confront us in early 2019, not those which applied back in 2016. Divisive it may be thought to be – but this country is already deeply divided under the Tories and the likely out-turn of a Tory Brexit is a deepening of those divisions.

A People’s Vote – among other options following the failure of this evening’s vote of confidence – is Labour conference policy on Brexit, and it is also clearly the policy of others, such as the SNP, but it now appears to be the only viable one that can provide a solution to the chaos which has engulfed government. Furthermore, given that, otherwise, we will crash out of the EU on 29 March by simple operation of the law, there is no time for a war of attrition based on repeated, confidence-sapping votes of confidence, no matter how legitimate such a tactic would be in more normal circumstances. There is an absolute deadline here – which is also written in the EU Withdrawal Act – which will dump us out of the EU automatically on that date, regardless of the politics, unless we do something about it.

We don’t yet know what May will bring back to parliament on Monday – the end of the three working days she is permitted by virtue of the efforts, again, of Dominic Grieve – but the early signs of her being willing to consult within parliament do not look good from the perspective of ensuring a Brexit that parliament could support. She seems to be standing by her infamous ‘red lines’, for example on a customs union and an independent trade policy, which have trapped her as a natural consequence into making this deal – the only one that could be signed, as we know from Michel Barnier’s very clear slide – as well as by a refusal to seek an extension of the Article 50 process. To say nothing of effective environmental protections and workers’ rights, as opposed to mere forms of words. Quite what a process of consultation means when – at least earlier on today – it apparently doesn’t involve the leader of the opposition – or any other otherwise sympathetic (on this issue) Labour MPs, it seems – is anyone’s guess. But as we also know, claiming to be listening is her go-to statement in times of defeat. To anyone else, it’s more can-kicking. Objectively, she’d be better off losing certain cabinet ministers than retaining these red lines at this point in the Brexit process – and, if the cross-party talks announced tonight are to have any meaning, those red lines, and the possibility of a no-deal Brexit, will have to go. Perhaps that is the purpose of the statement due at No. 10 shortly.

It would, at almost literally any point in the last two years, have been possible to construct a Brexit deal which would have gained the support of parliament and which could have implemented the 2016 referendum vote had May chosen to consult widely and construct a Brexit policy, on the softest possible basis, which not only MPs could have supported but which also reflected the narrowness of the 2016 vote itself. Even dyed-in-the-wool remainers like myself would, if not capable of actually supporting it, at least acknowledge it as being required to implement the referendum decision. Furthermore, this is what the UK public voted for in the 2017 snap election, by taking away May’s parliamentary majority and handing her instead a minority government (though, clearly, we didn’t know we were getting the DUP). The loss of the parliamentary majority was, by the way, evidence that our democracy does work. The people voted in 2016 voted for Brexit but with a substantial element of ‘remain’; and they voted in 2017 for consensus. At this late stage, they are getting, instead, it seems, a hard Brexit to appease the hard-liners in the Tories’ own ranks; and a political approach to Brexit governed by party dogma inspired by winner-take-allism and Tory infighting.

As Keir Starmer said last week, no consultation has ever taken place (£) within parliament – at least, not until tonight and, so far, only partially. We have, in its place, May’s red lines substantially based on her own interpretation of the 2016 vote and which have led us, inexorably and ridiculously, to this point. Without those red lines, a different deal would have been possible. It could yet be, were we to call a halt to the process and seek – via a general election – a pause in the political process in which to construct a different approach to Brexit to take to the UK people in search of their support. But, at this point, with no apparent way either of compelling May to abandon her red lines, or her government to quit, and if the talks starting from tonight turn out to be as fruitless as I imagine them to be simply because of May’s own intransigence and the continuing splits within the Tory Party, a People’s Vote is the only way out of this ‘shambles’. At this eleventh hour, there is no time left to explore a new deal based on parliamentary consensus around the art of the possible – which should have been done after the 2017 election – and a series of different red lines (were May so inclined to agree, and her fundamentally split Cabinet to agree as well).

Meanwhile, the catastrophe that a ‘no deal’ Brexit would represent is still a possible outcome, given our current position, and given that it is essentially the default should nothing else be done by 29 March. Whatever May is about to announce tonight, it needs to be at the very least that she will seek an extension to the Article 50 process. Even after a People’s Vote, by the way, there would still need to be a general election not least since the existing parliament, with party manifestos drawn up and MPs elected largely on the basis of implementing the 2016 referendum mandate, would clearly at that point have little further authority.

But we have now a political impasse, and a major deadline looming; and unless these cross-party talks are able to pull a rabbit out of the hat which also unites the Cabinet and the DUP, it is only right that we look now to the people to take us out of it via the only means available now that a timely general election is, apparently, not going to happen.

Queue-jumping: a few points in response

After returning yesterday evening from my trip out experiencing the atypical calm of a Hebridean autumn day, opening my Twitter account brought me denunciations of Theresa May’s reference to citizens from other EU countries coming to the UK as ‘queue jumping’. (And so, from calm to rage.) Quite rightly, too – it was offensive, shameful phrasing at which we can only wonder the reaction had this been said in Brussels, or Paris, or Madrid about British citizens taking advantage of free movement to make their lives in other countries – and no more ignorable for being just the latest in a long line of similar statements from Theresa May. I couldn’t pass up the chance to comment; and all the more so since the No. 10 spokesperson has apparently been trying to deny she said it: a pointlessly fallacious exercise (seemingly about semantics) when video exists of precisely what she said, and helpfully sub-titled, too. Either way, May was yesterday blowing a dog-whistle.

Firstly, the quote itself:

‘Once we’ve left the EU, we will be fully in control of who comes here. It will no longer be the case that EU nationals, regardless of the skills or experience they have to offer, can jump the queue ahead of engineers from Sydney, or software developers from Delhi.’

That is Brexit – right there. A complete misunderstanding of what EU rules and regulations allow us to do as a member; an obsession with queues and with others not following British (and British-influenced) queuing pecularities; and a hark back to the times when our closest links were not with those who with whom we have been building relationships over the last forty five years but with the countries of Empire.

The UK is not currently a part of the Schengen Agreement, so it still has borders at which it can routinely check the credentials of all who enter; and EU law means that those looking to stay beyond three months must be able to support themselves (and have comprehensive sickness insurance). The UK cannot enforce the three-month rule since it has no municipal procedure for registering citizens as do others in the EU (e.g. Belgium) and, while some might argue that this is a good thing from the perspective of the individual freedom of the citizen, it is, nevertheless, a public policy choice which prevents the UK from operating the rules of free movement as the EU actually envisages.

EU nationals working in this country to build their lives and this country are also skilled workers – some might even be engineers or software developers – and many of them were actually invited here by government departments to practise their skills and their professions. Several pieces of evidence – e.g. from the NHS – suggests that public services in particular may struggle in the light of the now-declining numbers of people coming into the UK for work from other EU countries. Furthermore, May’s reference has a presumption that freedom of movement for EU nationals is largely composed of people who have skill sets lower than those of engineers and software developers. Evidence on the skills mix is complicated but it is the case that ex-EU migrants are much more likely to be over-qualified for the jobs they are doing. And none of this is to ignore that care workers are required by the UK’s labour market – and increasingly so as our ‘domestic’ population ages.

The ending of free movement is of course a two-way street. In ending free movement for others to come here from the EU we are ending the free movement of UK nationals overseas, too. It is a truism to think that most ex-UK migrants have retired to Spain – the majority (some 80%) are of working age and, like most ex-EU nationals in this country, are likely actually to be in work. Regardless of the life situation of ex-UK migrants, they have all exercised entirely valid treaty rights and to castigate them, too, by implication, as queue jumpers is a disgracefully reactionary response.

The Migration Advisory Committee recently concluded that – to pick one of its several conclusions – ‘It remains the case that the majority of studies find no or little impact of immigration [i.e. from EEA countries] on the employment and unemployment outcomes of the UK-born workforce’ (para 1.30, p. 29). It is impossible to argue that importing engineers from Sydney would improve or deteriorate this position – but the logical end-point of seeing ex-EU nationals as ‘queue jumpers’ in the future is that the engineer from Sydney is likely to be preferred to the one from Germany. After all, pushing ‘queue jumpers’ back down the queue is the correct procedural etiquette. May’s quote is, in this context, insidious.

And finally, there is, of course, no such ‘queue’ of migrants waiting for jobs to emerge before coming to the UK – nor any such ‘priority’ being somehow given as a result to EU nationals. What there is, is an entirely arbitrary (and entirely baseless) ‘target’ of getting net migration (from all places elsewhere) down to below 100,000 annually first introduced by David Cameron in 2011 and then enthusiastically adopted by Theresa May. This immigration cap – declared recently by Alan Manning, chair of the Migration Advisory Commission, to be a ‘political target’ rather than actual immigration policy – is what is driving the notion that an engineer from Sydney can’t get into the country whereas Pawel the apprentice plumber fresh out of vocational school has no problem in doing so. It is a choice – we can have both depending on the requirements of our labour market, but it suits the government’s agenda to pretend that we can’t.

And therein lies the main issue – this relentless banging on about the problems of EU immigration is how the government is lining up to sell its ‘deal’. Theresa May – economically a remainer but socially and culturally a leaver – has form on this: it is what she knows and we all know that this is the only place where she is comfortable. It is an extension of the ‘hostile environment’ that she instituted when at the Home Office. We can expect more – much more – of this in the coming days and weeks now that the ERG’s loaded rifle has been revealed to be firing no more than blanks: it is May’s only chance of bringing the parliamentary arithmetic into a position that supports her approach.

[Edit: the exchange between journalists and the No. 10 spokesperson has now been published. It is not a meeting of minds – and, as regards the substance? Perhaps we can put it down to Theresa May being, again, very clear. Very clear.]

Brexit and government (in)competence

While we wait for the ‘will it, won’t it’ Cabinet to get the final details of the draft agreement still being hammered out in Brussels – the latest being that Wednesday night is the latest possible date to convene a November summit at EU level – I continue to be astonished by the admission of Brexit Secretary, Dominic Raab, last week that he ‘hadn’t quite understood‘ the importance of the Dover-Calais route for the trade of goods between the UK and Continental Europe. Not only the words of the admission, but also the style of it – Raab shows himself quite clearly to be a man scrabbling about in the dark for the words to describe something that he thinks may be Really Quite Important – is frankly astounding regardless of any consideration of his job as a minister.

It clearly ought to come as no surprise that the most important trade route is actually the shortest – and it takes neither professorial expertise in particle physics to work that out nor even a rudimentary understanding of the importance both to manufacturing companies and food freshness and quality of just-in-time deliveries. But the issue is really one of the extent to which Raab – another committed Brexiteer – has got to grips with his brief. Whatever the political involvement of ministers in the discussions – and I suspect it’s not a lot since the civil service sherpas will be doing most of the spadework – had he really missed his own Prime Minister asking people not to be alarmed about government plans for food and medicines stockpiling? (Don’t panic! Don’t panic!)? Simply failed to spot the import of the physical practicalities of trade links in his own post-lunch/graveyard slot appearance before the Exiting the EU Select Committee when he spoke about stockpiling? Simply missed out on the controversy about turning the M26 into a lorry park? Not in the office that day when his own Department published its technical notices? Or had he simply bought into John Redwood’s (extraordinary) explanation that it would be alright on the night since everything could come through Rotterdam to avoid those pesky French (of course, it can’t since Rotterdam is also in the single market).

It is a cause for worry when the minister with political responsibility and accountability for the state of negotiations is apparently so out of sorts with a geographical map. As well as for the effectiveness of that ‘meaningful vote’ in parliament when MPs will have increasingly little time to digest the content of the withdrawal agreement – clearly part of the government’s strategy to persuade parliament to back a deal (any deal) rather than engage in the chaos of withdrawal with none.

The discussions on avoiding a post-Brexit hard border in Northern Ireland continue to confound everyone (here’s a clue: it can’t be done while keeping both the 10 DUP MPs (hard Brexiteers in their own right – remember that covertly-funded Metro ad?) and the 50 or so extremists in the ERG happy about the terms of the withdrawal – even if the text of the agreement is now ‘almost ready‘ (this might or might not indicate that is is now more than 95% done). Andrea Leadsom was entirely wrong to talk at the weekend about the need to ‘hold our nerve‘ – this is not a case of taking a negotiation to the brink since this is not a normal negotiation: there are red lines, and implications of red lines, that can point only to one end – and that is a deal that Theresa May cannot sell to her own base. These are not problems of the EU’s making – they are entirely domestic in origin and stem completely from UK government failure to recognise the flaws in its own strategy. Ultimately, this point of reckoning has been coming ever since Theresa May chose to ally with the DUP to save her political skin.

The response to a Brexit deal that cannot pass through parliament – presuming that all Labour MPs hold their nerve on this – has to be a general election. This will have evident consequences for the due date of withdrawal. Keeping the UK at least aligned to the customs union and the EU single market (NB: I would absolutely prefer to remain in the EU) is the only way of preventing extremist Brexiteers from achieving their goal of a deregulated economy based on competition and with clear consequences for public services (much less, in a much-shrunken state with much greater financial implications for the individual) and the NHS (conceded completely to the market) – to say nothing of workers’ rights being swept away. Whatever the confusion over what people did vote for back in 2016, I’d be pretty sure this was not it.

Meanwhile, was it not a complete surprise that the UK was so noticeably absent from the Paris commemorations of the 100th anniversary of the Armistice? More than sixty heads of state and government – and, wearing shirt no. 12, er, David Lidington. The choice to make a biblical reading at Westminster Abbey rather than attend the commemoration in Paris sent a very clear, and absolutely shameful, signal. Nevertheless, in reminding everyone that a post-Brexit UK would really rather stay at home it was, instead, a strong pointer to what a travesty ‘Global Britain’ actually is.

Truly, this has been a government of all the talents.